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REcENT CASES
CONSTITTIONAL LAw-PLEA OF Fi= Am ENNT BFvoiux HOUSE
Suncomn=irrnn-Mrs. Intille, Mrs. Atkinson and Mr. Deacon had been
teachers in the Philadelphia Public School System for six, ten and
twenty-four years respectively. They were called before the Un-
American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives in
connection with an investigation of Communist activities in the
Philadelphia school system. All three claimed the privilege against
self-incrimination contained in the fifth amendment. Within three
days after their appearance each was rated "incompetent" by his
administrative supervisor and suspended, and dismissal was recom-
mended to the school board. A hearing was conducted for each by
the board on the charge of incompetency; neither Mrs. Atkinson nor
Mrs. Intille testified. Mrs. Intille offered evidence through counsel
of her good reputation, but this was rejected by the board because
the charge was based solely upon her appearance before the Com-
mittee. Mr. Deacon appeared and testified that he had previously
been associated with the Communist Party, but that he had been
dropped in 1945 and had not been in contact with the Communist
Party since that time, that he had taken the Pennsylvania Loyalty
Oath' in 1952, and that he had no affection or sympathy for the party
at the time of the hearing. After being discharged by the board, the
teachers appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.2 Held:
Reversed. Such a dismissal is an attempt at avoiding the Pennsyl-
vania Loyalty Act3 which provides that a discharge for disloyalty
must be proved by a fair preponderance of evidence at a proper
hearing, and is a denial of due process under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Board of Pub. Edue. v. Intille, 401 Pa. 1, 163 A.2d 420 (1960),
cert. denied, 81 Sup. Ct. 273 (1960).
Under the law in Pennsylvania at the time these teachers were
discharged there existed two possible avenues for dismissal. Under
the Public School Code,4 a teacher could have been dismissed on
grounds of "immorality, incompetency, cruelty, persistent negligence,
mental derangement, or persistent and wilful violations of the school
laws of the Commonwealth." (Formerly the Code had included in
this section as grounds for dismissal, "advocation of or participating
in un-American or subversive activities," but this was repealed
specifically in 1951.5 ) The second avenue for dismissal could have
1 As required by Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65 § 214 (1951).2Appeal from Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County, sustaining
the action by the Superintendent of Public Instruction who dismissed the indi-
vidual appeals of each teacher from the ruling of the Board of Education.
8 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65 §§ 211-225 (1951).4 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24 § 11-1122 (1949).
5 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65 §§211-225 (1951).
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been pursuant to the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, which provided for
a dismissal of a disloyal or subversive person as determined by a fair
preponderance of the evidence at a proper hearing.0
Clearly, the school board sought to use the remaining provisions
of the Public School Code to accomplish dismissal for "advocation
of or participating in un-American or subversive doctrines" by dis-
missing the teachers on grounds of incompetency, regardless of the
repeal of the provision formerly contained in the act. The result of
the court's decision thwarted this attempt and was based on the
answers to two underlying questions, i.e., whether the privilege is
available to a witness testifying before a House subcommittee; and
whether inferences of guilt may be drawn from a refusal to testify.
In The Fifth Amendment Today1 Dean Griswold points out that
historians can trace the origin of this privilege back to the 12th cen-
tury. By the latter half of the 17th century, we find many occasions
when this privilege was recognized by the English courts; and it has
since been continually recognized. Thus the privilege came to this
continent as a part of the legal heritage of our early settlers, and it
is not surprising that it was included in the proposals made by Con-
gress which became the fifth amendment.8 The clause reads: "No
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. . . ."9 Instead of being limited to criminal cases,
however, it has been extended to other situations, including Con-
gressional investigations.' 0 Cushman, in Civil Liberties in the United
States," indicates that "it extends to any official inquiry in which testi-
mony under oath may be compelled, such as a coroner's inquest,
a grand jury proceeding, or a legislative committee hearing, in which
a person is asked questions which might incriminate him."'
2
This appears to be in keeping with the spirit of the amendment.
It is in the committee hearing that the privilege is frequently needed
the most, because of the unique nature of an investigation. Griswold
points out the precarious position of the accused in such a hearing:
"answer truly and you have given evidence leading to your con-
viction for a violation of a federal law; answer falsely and you will
be convicted of perjury; refuse to answer and you will be found
6 Id. § 217.
7 Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955).
8 Id. at 2-7 for a more complete historical development of the privilege against
self-incrimination.
9 U.S. Const. amend. V.
3OSee e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
11 Cushman, Civil Liberties in the United States (1956).
12 Id. at 142-143.
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guilty of criminal contempt and punished by fine and imprison-
ment." 13 He adds:
Ordinarily when the privilege ... is exercised, it is in a criminal
trial. There a specific charge has been made, and the prosecution
has by evidence established a prima facie case of guilt.... Under
such circumstances there is much more than the mere claim of
the privilege on which to rest an inference of guilt.
In investigations, however, there are no carefully formulated
charges. Evidence to support such charges has not been introduced
and made known to the witness before he is called upon to answer.
He has no opportunity... to make explanations which might have a
material bearing on the whole situation. In the setting of an in-
vestigation, therefore, the basis for the inference from a claim of
privilege against self-incrimination is much less than it is when
the privilege is exercised in an ordinary criminal trial.14
The above statement touches on both points under discussion-
that the privilege is important in investigations before a legislative
body, and that the basis for influence of guilt to be drawn from a
claim of the privilege is weaker than it would be in criminal cases.
However, despite the strong statements of the Supreme Court that
a "sinister meaning" 3 should not be drawn from the plea, the ques-
tion is usually asked, "Why should anyone take advantage of the
privilege when he has nothing to hide?"
This question runs through Justice Mussmanno's dissent in the
principal case. He compares with questions regarding Communist
affiliations the following questions: "Do you sell narcotics to school
children? . ..Are you the person who burned down the Epochal
High School?... A year ago you said that your wife died of natural
causes, but we now have evidence that she was killed criminally.
Did you kill her? .. .Suppose a school physician had been asked
if he was infected with a malignant communicable disease."16 Ques-
tions dealing with Communist affiliations involve an infinite number
of shades of gray, whereas in non-political areas there may be only
black or white. In the opinion of Griswold, "we should give careful
attention in all cases to the nature of the question which is asked
and which the witness refuses to answer.... Here again the problem
is one of degree. There is no clear and sharply demarcated line. The
question whether a bank teller stole funds entrusted to him is one
sort of question. But the closer the question gets to the area of opin-
Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 21 (1955), quoting from Aiuppa
v. United States, 201 F.2d 287, 300 (6th Gir. 1952).
14 Griswold, op. cit. .supra note 13 at 21-22.
i5 Slochower v. Board of Educ. 350 U.S. 551, 557 (1956).
16401 Pa. 1, -, 163 A.2d 420, 443 (1960).
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ion and political belief, the less significant... is the refusal to answer
questions."
17
In an attempt to determine why people plead the fifth amend-
ment, Professor Daniel Pollitt sent questionnaires to 120 witnesses
who had availed themselves of the privilege. He categorized the
replies received as follows: (1) A belief that the question infringed
on the witness' freedom of speech, association, or conscience; (2)
A fear that answering a particular question would "waive" the right
to refuse to answer questions concerning the identity of others;
(3) A fear of perjury indictment if questions were answered in the
negative; (4) A desire to protect the integrity of the fifth amend-
ment or to support the position of others who have relied upon it;
(5) A belief that the fifth amendment is the only safe way to refuse
to co-operate with the committee; (6) A belief that the question
was not pertinent to the committee's business; (7) A fear that an-
swering a particular question would waive the right to plead the
amendment when asked other questions about his own activities;
(8) A fear that an answer would cause public humiliation, economic
hardship, or social ostracism to the witness; (9) Miscellaneous, e.g.
the fifth amendment as a grant of the right to be confronted with wit-
nesses; the right to silence, retained by the people under the tenth
amendment and the due process clause of the fifth amendment.'
8
The Supreme Court has never had to decide squarely whether
or not an innocent man may validly plead self-incrimination. In
1955, however, Chief Justice Warren, quoting from Twining v.
New Jersey [211 U.S. 782 (1908)] stated that the privilege against
self-incrimination is "a protection to the innocent though a shelter
to the guilty," and urged that it must be liberally construed. 10
It is clear that in many cases the possibility of incrimination might
arise from a man's testimony even though he is innocent. Even if it
were unlawful for one to invoke the fifth amendment on the ground
that he wishes to avoid public embarrassment and ridicule, it would
be difficult to determine that these were the real reasons for the plea.
At most, however, the offender would be guilty of contempt, and
not the offense alleged. To allow the court or an investigating body
to draw inferences of guilt from a refusal to testify would be to
allow the development of a doctrine in constitutional law similar
to that of res ipsa loquitur in tort law, providing a prima facie case
17 Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 58 (1955).
18 Pollitt, "The Fifth Amendment Plea Before Congressional Committee
Investigating Subversion; Motives and Justifiable Presumptions-A Survey of 120
Witnesses," 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117, 1128-1182 (1958).
19 Cushman, Civil Liberties in the United States 142 (1956).
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from the refusal to answer where the evidence against the accused
had failed.
There were cases touching these points prior to Intille. Slochower
v. Board of Educ.20 involved a teacher who refused to testify before
a House subcommittee, and was discharged pursuant to section 303
of the New York City Charter, which provided that "whenever an
employee of the City utilizes the privilege . . . to avoid answering
a question relating to his official conduct, his term or tenure of office
or employment shall terminate. . . ." The Supreme Court held that
this charter was invalid because it contained a built-in inference
of guilt derived from the plea of the fifth amendment.
However, in Nelson v. County of Los Angeles,21 the Court upheld
a similar statute. That statute imposed a duty to answer upon any
public employee appearing before any investigating agency and pre-
scribed that one who refused was guilty of insubordination and could
be dismissed. The Court distinguished this statute from the one in
Slochower on the basis that the latter did not contain built-in inference
of guilt as a result of the plea. This is a somewhat tenuous distinc-
tion, since by phrasing the statute to avoid the built-in inference
of guilt the legislature could vest in the employing agency the power
to dismiss an employee for the sole reason that he invoked the
privilege.
In Bielan v. Board of Pub. EduC., 2 2 a teacher was discharged
for refusing to answer questions of his administrative supervisor.
The Court upheld this dismissal. The distinction between this
and the other cases is less troublesome, since the rating of in-
competency and the dismissal were based on the relationship be-
tween the accused and his administrative supervisor, rather than his
relationship with an agency of the United States.
The result of this chain of decisions, therefore, is that an ad-
ministrative board may discharge a public employee for refusing
to answer the questions of his administrative supervisor or of a
legislative body where a statute puts an affirmative duty upon him to
testify and contains no built-in inference of guilt. A board may not,
however, dismiss an employee for not answering the questions of a
legislative body where the witness is required to testify by a statute
which contains a built-in inference of guilt, or where there is no
applicable statute.
2 3
Durward W. Caudill
20 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
21362 U.S. 1 (1959).
22357 U.S. 399 (1958).23 Three allied cases have been argued before the Supreme Court, but
(Footnote continued on next page)
